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After commenting briefly on the role of the typicality assumption in science, we advocate a
phenomenological approach to the cosmological measure problem. Like any other theory, a measure
should be simple, general, well-defined, and consistent with observation. This allows us to proceed
by elimination. As an example, we consider the proper time cutoff on a geodesic congruence. It
predicts that typical observers are quantum fluctuations in the early universe, or Boltzmann babies.
We sharpen this well-known youngness problem by taking into account the expansion and open
spatial geometry of pocket universes. Moreover, we relate the youngness problem directly to the
probability distribution for observables, such as the temperature of the cosmic background radiation.
We consider a number of modifications of the proper time measure, but find none that would make
it compatible with observation.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Typicality
Every time we interpret an experiment, we assume that
we are a typical observer. Suppose, for example, that we
are trying to distinguish between two theories T1 and T2.
Conveniently, they predict a very different value of the
spin of an electron subjected to a suitable sequence of
interactions: T1 predicts spin up with probability ǫ, and
T2 predicts spin down with probability ǫ.
If ǫ ≪ 1, then even a single measurement will allow
us to rule out one of these theories with considerable
confidence. We can improve our confidence by repeating
the experiment, but for simplicity, let us suppose that ǫ
is so miniscule that we are satisfied with doing a single
experiment.
In drawing the above conclusions, we acted as if our
laboratory either was the only laboratory in the universe,
or was selected at random from among all the laborato-
ries doing the same experiment in the universe. This is
the assumption of typicality. Note that we have no direct
evidence for this assumption. We do not know whether
there are other laboratories performing the same experi-
ment on some far-away planets; and if there are, then our
laboratory was presumably not actually selected by any-
one from among them. Nevertheless, the overall success
of the scientific method so far suggests that this assump-
tion is appropriate.
To see this, consider a prescription favored by Hartle
and Srednicki [1], who decline to assume typicality. They
argue that it does not matter whether a given outcome
is likely to occur in a randomly chosen laboratory; what
matters is whether one is likely to be able to find some
laboratory, somewhere in all of spacetime, no matter how
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atypical, in which that outcome occurs. This probability
is given not by ǫ, but by 1 − (1 − ǫ)L, where L is the
number of laboratories in the universe.
The effect of using this probability-of-global-existence
is most dramatic in the case where L≫ ǫ−1 ≫ 1. Then
we cannot rule out either theory, no matter what we
observe. We can still rule out one of the two theories
by repeating the experiment sufficiently often. But to
know at which point we can reject one of the theories, we
would need to know how many other laboratories there
are. Since we do not know L, the Hartle-Srednicki pre-
scription would put an end to experimental science. It
would render all experiments pointless, because we could
not reject any theory until we know how many other lab-
oratories there are. Given the success of the scientific
method thus far, we may conclude the Hartle-Srednicki
prescription is inappropriate.1
Here we have argued for the assumption of typicality
on empirical grounds: it has served us well as a heuristic
tool. If it was wrong, we should not have been successful
in devising and rejecting scientific theories on the basis
of this assumption. But why does it work so well? This,
too, can be understood; elegant discussions have recently
been given by Page [2], and by Garriga and Vilenkin [3],
who also offer a careful definition of the class of observers
among which we may consider ourselves to be typical.
1 We cannot conclude that our laboratory is the only one, since
we could simply build a second one. Note that in the Hartle-
Srednicki prescription, this would be inadvisable, since it would
render the experiments performed at either laboratory less con-
clusive.
2B. The measure problem: a phenomenological
approach
In the multiverse, we can use typicality to make sta-
tistical predictions for the results of observations. For
instance, to predict the cosmological constant, we would
first determine the theoretically allowed values, and then
count the number of observations of each value. The
probability to observe a given value of the cosmological
constant is proportional to the number of observations, in
the multiverse, of that value. The problem is that under
rather generic conditions, the universe will have infinite
spacetime volume, even if it is spatially finite (i.e., con-
tains a compact Cauchy surface). Then the number of
observations can diverge.
The landscape of string theory contains perhaps 10500
metastable vacua, allowing it to solve the cosmological
constant problem [4]; see Refs. [5, 6] for a review. How-
ever, divergences would arise even if there was only one
false vacuum. For example, suppose that there was a
first-order phase transition in our past, by which a long-
lived metastable vacuum decayed. The symmetries of the
instanton mediating this decay [7] dictate that the result-
ing true vacuum region is an infinite open FRW universe.
It will contain either no observers, or an infinite number
of them. Moreover, the parent vacuum will keep expand-
ing faster than it decays, so that an infinite number of
true vacuum bubbles (or “pocket universes”) are created
over time [8].
The measure problem in cosmology is the question of
how to regulate these infinities, in order to get a finite
count of the number of observations of each type.2 The
choice of measure is no minor technicality, but an inte-
gral part of a complete theory of cosmology. Two differ-
ent measures often assign exponentially different relative
probabilities to two types of observations.3
Ultimately, a unique measure should arise from first
principles in a fundamental theory [11, 12, 13, 14]. In the
meantime, however, we may regard the measure prob-
lem as a phenomenological challenge. At least in the
2 In general, the question of what constitutes one observation is a
difficult problem. For instance, it is not obvious precisely how
many observations of the CMB temperature should be assigned
to our local efforts on Earth. (See Ref. [9] for a recent proposal
using entropy production.) However, these considerations are
orthogonal to the issue at hand, which is the regularization of
the infinite spacetime four-volume arising in eternal inflation.
Here, we will assume that the local counting of observations is
unambiguous.
3 A simple example arises even if there is only one false vacuum.
Each true vacuum bubble collides with an infinite number of
other such bubbles, so one may ask whether we are likely to
live in a collision region. Leaving aside fatal effects of collisions,
this probability is nevertheless exponentially small in the proper
time measure considered here, and also in the causal diamond
measure [9]. But if one averages over worldlines emanating from
the nucleation point, all but a set of measure zero of them will
immediately enter a collision region [10].
semiclassical regime, we can hope to identify the correct
measure by the traditional scientific method: We try a
simple, minimal theory, and work out its implications.
If they conflict with observation, we either refine (i.e.,
complicate) the model, or we abandon it altogether for a
different approach.
What one may regard as a simple measure is, to some
extent, in the eye of the beholder. The same can be said
for simple theories; yet, for the most part, we know one
when we see one. Only a handful of measures have been
proposed (see, e.g, Refs. [15, 16, 17] for overviews and
further references), and many of them can be seen to con-
flict with observation, often violently. This is good news,
because it makes it feasible to proceed by elimination.
Let us investigate simple proposals, let us ask whether
they are well-defined, and let us determine whether they
conflict with observation.
For example, consider the proposal of Ref. [18]. In
its original form, it predicted with probability 1 that we
should find ourselves as isolated observers (“Boltzmann
brains”) resulting from a highly suppressed thermal fluc-
tuation in a late, empty universe [19, 20]. This led to a re-
finement [21], which complicates the measure and seems
ad hoc [22]. Depending on the details of the string land-
scape, the proposal may render most vacua dynamically
inaccessible (the “staggering problem” of Refs. [23, 24]).
This would also amount to a conflict with observation,
namely the prediction that we should observe a much
larger cosmological constant with probability very close
to 1. Perhaps most importantly, at present the proposal
is well-defined only in the thin-wall limit of bubble for-
mation, and if bubble collisions are neglected [10].4
Another recent proposal [9], the “holographic” or
“causal diamond” measure, has so far fared well. It is
well-defined in the semiclassical limit, and it does not
have a staggering problem [25]. Its prediction of the cos-
mological constant agrees significantly better with the
data than that of any other proposal [26], and it contin-
ues to agree well even as other parameters are allowed
to vary [27]. It will be important to test this proposal
further, for example, by allowing even more parameters
to vary. But it is encouraging that we have at least one
well-defined measure that has not been ruled out.
In this paper, we consider a much older proposal, the
proper time measure [28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. At present,
this measure is not completely well-defined, and we will
comment on some issues that will have to be overcome
to make it well-defined. But our main focus will be on
its well-known conflict with observation, the “youngness
4 The proposal cuts off the infinite number of observers in different
vacuum bubbles by restricting to a “unit comoving volume”, de-
fined by appealing to the universality of the open universe metric
inside every bubble at early times [18]. But universality holds
only if the thickness of the wall, and its collisions with other bub-
bles, are both neglected. These two assumptions cannot both be
satisfied to a good approximation.
3paradox”. In particular, we will investigate whether sim-
ple modifications of the measure can resolve this problem.
C. The proper time measure and the youngness
paradox
To apply the proper time measure, one begins by se-
lecting an (almost arbitrary) finite portion of a spacelike
slice in the semiclassical geometry. The congruence of
geodesics orthogonal to this initial surface defines Gaus-
sian normal coordinates, and thus a time slicing, at least
until caustics are encountered. The number of observa-
tions between the initial slice and the time t is finite.
Globally, the multiverse reaches a self-reproducing state
at late times: its volume expands exponentially, but the
ratio of different types of observations remains constant
and finite. Therefore, relative probabilities defined by
this measure are independent of the initial conditions.
Earlier work [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39] has already
shown that the proper time measure has a youngness
problem: it predicts with essentially 100% probability
that we should be living at an earlier time. The reason
for this problem can roughly be described as follows.
The asymptotic rate of expansion of the multiverse
is dominated by the vacuum with the largest Hubble
constant Hbig, which defines a microphysical time-scale
H−1big . (In the string landscape, this would be of order the
Planck time.) For simplicity, let us consider only regions
occupied by our own vacuum. We may ask about the dis-
tribution of the age of such bubbles, i.e., how long before
the cutoff t they were formed. In particular, we may ask
how many bubbles are at least 13.7 Gyr old, and thus con-
tain observations like ours; and we may compare this to
the number of bubbles that are, say, 13 Gyr old. The size
of the bubble interior is not much affected by these differ-
ent time choices, but the number of bubbles will be vastly
different. For every bubble that is at least 13.7 Gyr old at
the time t, there will be of order exp
(
3× 0.7Gyr/H−1big
)
bubbles that are 13 Gyr old, because of the overall ex-
ponential growth of the volume of the multiverse in the
extra 700 million years before it has its last chance to nu-
cleate the younger bubbles. Perhaps the younger bubbles
contain fewer observers per bubble, but surely not so few
as to compensate for a factor exp(1060). This mismatch
persists as t → ∞. Thus, typical observers are younger
than we are, and the probability for an observer to live
as late as we do is exp(−1060). This rules out the proper
time measure at an extremely high level of confidence.
Of course, our choice of 13 Gyr observers as a compar-
ison group is arbitrary. Because H−1big is a microphysical
scale, even observers just one minute younger (relative
to their big bang) are superexponentially more probable
than we are. Ultimately, one should consider observers of
any cosmological age. Because of the exponential pres-
sure to be young, it pays to arise from a rare quantum
fluctuation in the early universe. The most likely ob-
servers are such “Boltzmann babies”, and the most likely
observations are the phenomena of the hot, dense, early
universe they see.
D. Summary and outline
Our goal in this paper is two-fold. First, we will make
the youngness paradox more precise. Traditional treat-
ments have neglected the expansion of new bubbles. We
supply a justification for this “square bubble” approxima-
tion, by extending Gaussian normal coordinates across an
expanding bubble wall, and showing that our exact treat-
ment reproduces the usual youngness problem. We will
distinguish carefully between probability distributions for
the time when observers live (which is not directly ob-
servable), and probability distributions for actual observ-
ables, like the temperature of the background radiation
measured by observers [37]. We find that the youngness
paradox manifests itself by predicting that we should ob-
serve a higher temperature than 2.7 K, with probability
exponentially close to 1.
Our second goal is to consider possible modifications
of the proper time measure. We will argue that it is dif-
ficult to resolve the youngness paradox, other than by
abandoning the measure altogether. In particular, Linde
has proposed a modification in the context of a partic-
ular toy model [38]. Since no general prescription was
given, it is not clear how to extend this modification to
other settings, and in particular to the probability dis-
tribution for the observed background temperature. We
consider a number of possible choices, some of which re-
duce to the prescription of Ref. [38] for the particular
probabilities computed therein. However, we are unable
to find any modification that escapes all of the conflicts
with observation that arise from the youngness problem.
In particular, 2.7 K remains an extremely atypical value
of the background temperature under all choices we con-
sider.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Sec. II,
we explain the proper time measure in more detail. In
Sec. III, we compute the paths of geodesics entering bub-
bles, in order to determine the shape of the proper time
cutoff within bubbles. In Sec. IV, we compute the proba-
bility distribution for the spacetime location of observers,
finding a youngness paradox and conflict with observa-
tion. In Sec. V, we try a few modifications of the measure,
but find no simple modification consistent with observa-
tion.
II. THE PROPER TIME MEASURE
The proper time measure (sometimes referred to as
the “standard volume weighted measure”) is one of the
simplest and most straightforward ways of regulating
the infinities of the multiverse. Choose a small three-
dimensional patch of space, Σ0, orthogonal to at least
4one eternally inflating geodesic. Then, construct Gaus-
sian normal coordinates [40] in its future. That is, a given
event has the time coordinate t if it occurs at proper time
t along a geodesic orthogonal to Σ0. Such events form
a three-dimensional hypersurface Σt. The regularization
scheme is to count only observations between proper time
hypersurfaces Σ0 and Σt. Relative probabilities are de-
fined by ratios, in the limit t→∞.
Σ0
Σt
Boltzmann Babies
FIG. 1: The relative probability of making different observa-
tions, for example two different CMB temperatures (red disks
or blue boxes), is determined by simple counting in the finite
region between Σ0 and Σt. The ratio tends to a finite limit as
t → ∞. The youngness problem is the fact that anomalous
early fluctuations producing either observation (Boltzmann
babies) turn out to dominate the count. To show this cor-
rectly in the figure, one would need to draw an exponentially
large number of “young bubbles”, like the one on the right,
in which only the Boltzmann babies contribute.
It is well-known that Gaussian normal coordinates are
only locally defined. They break down at caustics, or
focal points, where infinitesimally neighboring geodesics
in the congruence intersect. Beyond such points, the
above definition of the time coordinate t is ambiguous.
We sidestep the issue here by considering only expand-
ing spacetime regions and ignoring clustering and inho-
mogeneities (and thus, strictly speaking, all known ob-
servers), so that focusing does not occur.
Let O1 and O2 be two mutually exclusive observations.
For example, O1 may subsume any observation made in
vacuum A, while O2 corresponds to vacuum B. Or O1
(O2) may be capture information about the observer’s
spatial or temporal location within a given vacuum, for
example the fact that universe is matter (vacuum) dom-
inated.
Let Ni(t) be the number of observations of type Oi
made in the four volume between Σ0 and Σt. Obser-
vations take a finite time, so for definiteness let us de-
mand that an observation must be complete for it to be
counted. The relative probability for the two observa-
tions is defined to be
p(O1)
p(O2)
= lim
t→∞
N1(t)
N2(t)
. (1)
Similarly, we can consider a continuous set of possi-
ble observations OT , such as the observation of a CMB
temperature T . In this case, we are interested in the
probability density dp/dT , which is given by
dp
dT
∣∣∣
T1
dp
dT
∣∣∣
T2
= lim
t→∞
dN
dT
∣∣
T1
(t)
dN
dT
∣∣
T2
(t)
(2)
Here, dpdT
∣∣∣
T1
dT is the probability of observing T in the
interval (T1, T1 + dT ).
dN
dT
∣∣
T1
dT is the number of in-
stances of such observations in the four-volume between
Σ0 and Σt.
5
At late times, Ni(t) ∝ exp(3Hbigt). The overall scaling
rate Hbig is set by the most rapidly expanding vacua [41].
[In the string landscape, one expects that Hbig ∼ O(1) in
Planck units.] This exponential growth guarantees that
lim
t→∞
N1(t)
N2(t)
= lim
t→∞
N ′1(t)
N ′2(t)
, (3)
where N ′i = dNi/dt is the rate at which observations of
type Oi are being made, integrated over space but not
over time. Thus, it does not matter whether probabilities
are computed from the total number of observations until
the time t, or the rate of observations at the time t, or
the number of observations made in some recent (fixed
width) time interval (t−∆t, t). For definiteness, however,
we will stick to the first of these definitions.
III. GEODESICS CROSSING BUBBLES
A. Open FRW time vs. geodesic time
The measure discussed above was first applied to slow-
roll models of eternal inflation, without first-order phase
transitions [29, 30]. In this case, one keeps track of
fluctuations of scalar fields on the Hubble scale, effec-
tively assuming that they decohere every Hubble time
(see Ref. [42] for a discussion of the validity of this ap-
proach). There is no obstruction to applying the same
measure to models with bubble formation, but there is
an annoying complication (Fig. 2).
Consider a region of the universe at late times, oc-
cupied by a “host” de Sitter vacuum with cosmological
constant 3H2out. Let us suppose that Hout is very large,
but far enough below the Planck scale to lend validity to
our semiclassical treatment. Moreover, we suppose that
a bubble of our own vacuum can form by a Coleman-
DeLuccia (CDL) tunneling process inside the host vac-
uum.
5 In the continuous case, one must take care with the order of
limits. First we pick a finite dT and define ratios as usual, by
taking t → ∞. Then we repeat the procedure while taking dT →
0.
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FIG. 2: The top figure shows slices of constant FRW time,
τ (red, light) and slices of constant geodesic time t (blue,
dark) in the vicinity of a bubble wall (green, thick) with initial
size r0 = 0.1H
−1
out
. Note that the constant t slices are not
defined for geodesics passing through the nucleation region
of the bubble. The lower figure shows that geodesics of the
congruence (blue, dark) eventually asymptote to comoving
FRW worldlines (red, light).
Let us suppose, moreover, that the host vacuum has
existed for many Hubble times H−1out. Then, on the scale
about to be occupied by a newly formed bubble, the
geodesics emanating from the initial surface Σ0 can be
treated as comoving in the flat de Sitter metric
ds2 = −dt2 +H−2oute
2Houttdx2 (4)
This follows, in a sense, from the de Sitter no-hair theo-
rem; we will also find that it is consistent with our careful
analysis in Sec. III C.
Now suppose that a bubble of our vacuum forms at
the time tnuc. It will appear at rest, with a proper ra-
dius r0 ≪ H
−1
out determined by the CDL instanton. Then
it will expand at constant acceleration r−10 , its world-
volume asymptoting to a light-cone. Some of the above
geodesics will eventually run into the bubble wall and
enter our universe. Their behavior will determine the
weight of any observations carried out inside the bubble,
in the proper time measure.
We will not consider the small subset of geodesics that
go through the nucleation region, r . r0, where the clas-
sical geometry is not clearly defined. It is unclear how to
treat these geodesics. This constitutes a challenge for the
sharp formulation of congruence-based measures. The
best we can say is that our results show that values of
r ∼ O(r0) contribute negligibly to the measure as they
are approached from above in a controlled regime. This
could be viewed as evidence that the contribution of the
uncontrolled regime can also be neglected.
The metric inside the bubble is given by an open FRW
geometry; ignoring fluctuations, the metric is
ds2 = −dτ2 + a(τ)2(dξ2 + sinh2 ξ dΩ22) . (5)
where the scale factor a(τ) comprises, for anthropically
relevant bubbles, a period of inflation followed by radi-
ation, matter, and vacuum domination with very small
cosmological constant. Note that a(τ) ≈ τ for sufficiently
small τ .
The maximally symmetric and negatively curved spa-
tial slices defined by τ = const are physically preferred
inside the bubble, since they correspond to hypersurfaces
of (approximately) constant density. Only at very late
times, well into the vacuum-dominated era, do we lose
this preferred slicing, as the universe again becomes lo-
cally empty de Sitter.
The key point is that the preferred surfaces of constant
FRW time τ are not the surfaces Σt of constant geodesic
time t. This is a complication, since τ is what we usu-
ally call the age of the universe, the time since the big
bang—really, the metric distance from the bubble nu-
cleation event. To the extent that any time variable is
directly correlated with the outcome of an observation
(such as CMB temperature or the amount of clustering),
that variable will be the FRW time τ , and not the global
time t.
B. Square bubble approximation
The square bubble approximation, which is implicit
in Ref. [16], aims to circumvent this complication. It
amounts to a deformation of the metric that allows us
to calculate as if constant τ slices, inside the bubble, co-
incide with constant t slices. For this we must arrange
that the FRW time τ and the geodesic time t differ only
through a constant shift,
τ = t− tnuc . (6)
This is possible only if the movement of the bubble wall
is neglected.
Given this ad-hoc modification, the continuation of the
geodesic congruence into the bubble cannot be directly
computed. We will simply assume that the internal ge-
ometry of the new vacuum is a spatially finite piece of a
flat FRW universe
ds2 = −dτ2 + a˜(τ)2dy2 . (7)
To match at t = tnuc (τ = 0), we let y range over a finite
physical volume a˜(0)3Vy. We take the comoving volume
to be independent of τ , as if the bubble wall remained at
fixed y.
6Note that both the scale factor and the initial size of
the bubble initially differ significantly from their true
values, and the matching to the outside fails at late
times. However, in inflating vacua the exponential in-
ternal growth is more important than the expansion of
the bubble forming their boundary. Moreover, inflation
locally washes out the difference between a flat and an
open universe. After a short time (say, a few e-foldings
of inflation) we can take a˜(τ) ∝ a(τ).
Nevertheless, the square bubble approximation bla-
tantly contradicts important known features, such as the
fact that the constant-density slices inside are actually
open and infinite. Indeed it is not even consistent ge-
ometrically, making it impossible to match the inside of
the bubble to the outside. But one may hope that it gives
a reasonable approximation for the purpose of computing
probabilities. This will be the case if the approximation
does not change the true count of observations of various
types. We will find that the square bubble approximation
is a good one for many questions.
C. Exact relation
The actual relation between the FRW coordinates
(τ, ξ) and the geodesic proper time t is more complicated.
We set
Hout = 1 in this subsection, (8)
so that the equations are not quite so ugly. In the outside
flat deSitter slicing,
ds2 = −dt2 + e2t
(
dr2 + r2dΩ22
)
, (9)
the domain wall follows the trajectory
rw exp(tw − tnuc) = r0 cosh η , (10)
exp(tw − tnuc) = r0 sinh η +
√
1− r20 . (11)
Here r0 is the size of the bubble at nucleation; it is also
the radius of curvature and the inverse proper accelera-
tion of the domain wall. r0η is the proper time along the
domain wall.
We need to compute the motion of geodesics as they
cross the domain wall and live happily ever after in the
interior. The natural coordinates inside the bubble are
the open FRW coordinates (τ, ξ) of Eq. (5) because they
respect the symmetry of the bubble nucleation. However,
these coordinates do not cover the region containing the
domain wall, so it is convenient to use a different coor-
dinate system near the domain wall. Assuming that the
Hubble constant in the interior of the bubble is much
smaller than the Hubble constant in the exterior, we can
find a scale τ∗ such that H−1in ≫ τ
∗ ≫ H−1out. The region
from the domain wall to the τ∗ surface is much smaller
than the characteristic scales of the geometry inside the
bubble. As a result, we can approximate it as a piece of
Minkowski space. We will use coordinates in which the
metric is
ds2 = −dT 2 + dR2 +R2dΩ22 . (12)
Because the domain wall is a constant curvature sur-
face with curvature radius r0, its trajectory in the
Minkowski coordinates is
Rw = r0 cosh η , (13)
Tw = r0 sinh η , (14)
where again r0η is the proper time along the domain wall.
Computing the 4-velocity, we find that η is the rapidity
of the domain wall.
The trajectory of the geodesic after crossing the do-
main wall is
T = r0 sinh η + (t− tw) coshα , (15)
R = r0 cosh η + (t− tw) sinhα , (16)
where α is the rapidity of the geodesic. We will determine
α by demanding that the angle between the domain wall
and the geodesic is continuous across the domain wall6.
If u and v are the 4-velocities of the geodesic and the
domain wall, we demand
u · v|out = u · v|in . (17)
Since α is the rapidity of the geodesic and η is the rapidity
of the domain wall,
u · v|in = cosh(η − α) . (18)
Geodesics outside the domain wall have a simple 4-
velocity uout = (1, 0, 0, 0), and since we have identified
r0η as the proper time along the domain wall, the 4-
velocity of the domain wall is v = ( 1r0 dtw/dη, ...). Using
the equation (11) for the trajectory of the domain wall,
u · v|out =
1
r0
dtw
dη
=
cosh η
r0 sinh η +
√
1− r20
. (19)
Thus the equation determining α is
cosh η
r0 sinh η +
√
1− r20
= cosh(η − α) . (20)
It is convenient to combine Eq. (20) and (11) to get
cosh η exp [−(tw − tnuc)] = cosh(η − α) . (21)
6 At the domain wall, the first derivative of the metric is discon-
tinuous, resulting in a delta function in Rµν in the thin wall
approximation. However because the connection only depends
on first derivatives, we can find a local coordinate system where
the connection Γγµν is finite. This proves that the angle (inner
product) between the geodesic and the domain wall is continuous
across the wall.
7Simplifying we find
(tw − tnuc) = α− ln(1 + ε) , (22)
where
ε =
e2α − 1
e2η + 1
. (23)
This is a convenient rewriting because one can show that
ε≪ 1 for all geodesics as long as the critical bubble size
is small in Hubble units, r0 ≪ 1.
We want to rewrite the geodesics in terms of the open
FRW coordinates which will be adapted to the cosmo-
logical evolution inside the bubble. For τ ≪ H−1in , where
the geometry is approximately Minkowski space, the re-
lationship is
τ =
√
T 2 −R2 (24)
ξ = tanh−1
R
T
. (25)
Using the trajectory in (R, T ) given by Eq. (15), (16), we
find the trajectory in FRW coordinates
ξ = α+O(
1
τ
) , (26)
τ =
√
(t− tw)2 + 2r0(t− tw) sinh(η − ξ)− r20 .(27)
Our goal is to manipulate all of the above equations in
order to find a single equation for the geodesic time since
nucleation, t − tnuc, as a function of the natural coordi-
nates τ, ξ inside the bubble.
We will be interested in events which occur a rea-
sonable distance away from the domain wall, so that
τ, t − tnuc, t − tw ≫ 1. So we can drop the subleading
terms in (26) and just set the rapidity of the geodesic
equal to the comoving coordinate, α = ξ. Physically, the
point is that the final comoving position of the geodesic
is determined only by its velocity and not by its initial
location. The nontrivial statement in (26) is that the
geodesics become comoving in a time set by the Hubble
scale outside the bubble, H−1out.
In Eq. (27) we can now set α = ξ and expand for large
t− tw to get
τ = t− tw + r0 sinh(η − ξ) . (28)
Going back to (20) and solving for sinh(η − ξ) we find
sinh(η − ξ) =
√
1− r20 sinh η − r0
r0 sinh η +
√
1− r20
. (29)
Using the relation (11) between η and tw this can be
rewritten as
sinh(η− ξ) =
1
r0
[√
1− r20 − exp [−(tw − tnuc)]
]
. (30)
So we have an equation relating the geodesic time since
nucleation to the FRW time τ and the time tw the
geodesic crosses the domain wall:
τ = t− tw +
[√
1− r20 − exp[−(tw − tnuc)]
]
. (31)
Now we can use the relation (22) between the rapidity
α and tw, together with α = ξ, to get
τ = t−tnuc−
[
ξ+e−ξ−
√
1− r20+εe
−ξ−ln(1+ε)
]
, (32)
where ε is given by (23). Expanding in ε and restor-
ing the factors of Hout, we get the final formula relating
the geodesic time to the natural coordinates inside the
bubble:
t− tnuc = τ +H
−1
out
[
ξ + e−ξ − 1 + ...
]
. (33)
As expected, the difference between the geodesic proper
time and the open FRW time depends non-trivially on
the radial FRW coordinate ξ.
IV. THE SPACETIME LOCATION OF A
TYPICAL OBSERVER
The proper time measure makes nontrivial and inter-
esting predictions for vacuum selection, which do not ap-
pear to contradict anything we know [43]. However, as
soon as we ask about the probabilities of different obser-
vations in the same vacuum, the measure wildly conflicts
with observation. It has two properties that result in
a squeeze. On the one hand, for an observation to be
counted, it must occur before the cutoff t. On the other
hand, the multiverse as a whole is expanding exponen-
tially on a microscopic characteristic time scale. This
makes it favorable to wait as long as possible until cre-
ating a low-energy, slowly expanding region like the one
in which we are making our observations, and it strongly
favors observations that happen soon after the fastest ex-
panding vacuum has decayed. This is the general idea of
the youngness paradox [33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39].
We will present one explicit calculation to show the fact
that, within bubbles identical to ours, the probability to
live at 13.7 Gyr is vanishingly small compared to the
probability to live at 13 Gyr. There is nothing new in
this calculation, but it will be easier to see how the exact
geometry we found goes into the paradox in Sec. IVC,
and how to analyze possible modifications in Sec. V.
Another manifestation of the youngness paradox is
that if a number of tunneling events are necessary to get
from the fastest inflating vacuum to our host vacuum,
these successive tunneling events will tend to be sepa-
rated by only the Planckian time interval H−1big . Since
the tunneling events are not well-separated, this renders
it difficult to compute semiclassically. However, since
such a quick succession of tunneling events does not ob-
viously contradict observation, we sidestep this difficulty
8here by assuming that our vacuum is produced directly
from the fastest inflating vacuum. Hence we set
Hout = Hbig . (34)
This simplification makes the problem more well-defined;
however, every indication is that the characteristic time
scale appearing in the youngness paradox is H−1big , regard-
less of this simplification.
A. The youngness paradox in the square bubble
approximation
We begin with an analysis in the square bubble ap-
proximation defined in Sec. III B. By assumption, each
bubble appears as a flat patch of the same physical size.
Hence, the comoving volume Vx taken up by a bubble
in the outside metric goes like exp(−3Hbigtnuc). Note,
however, that we have rescaled the Euclidean spatial co-
ordinates inside the bubble, dy = exp(Hbigtnuc)dx, so as
to make the metric in each bubble explicitly the same
(not just equivalent by diffeomorphism). In the sequel,
“comoving volume” will usually refer to the inside metric
and will accordingly be denoted Vy . It will be the same
for each bubble, and so will drop out of probabilities.
Let n(t) be the total number of bubbles of our type
produced prior to the time t. This grows exponentially
with time:
n(t) = C exp(3Hbigt) . (35)
Here C is a fixed constant, which depends on the size of
Σ0, the initial state, and the rate at which our vacuum is
produced (directly or indirectly) by the fastest inflating
vacuum. This constant will drop out in all ratios.
The nucleation of a bubble like ours will be followed by
the formation of observers. Let dN (1) be the number of
observations of some type, in a single bubble of our type,
in a comoving volume of size dVy during the proper time
interval (τ, τ + dτ) after the formation of the bubble. By
the homogeneity of the FRW universe, dN (1) will depend
only on the FRW time, τ , so we can write
dN (1) = f(τ) dτ dVy . (36)
The function f(τ) can be thought of as an observer den-
sity.
As long as these observations involve looking out into
the sky, they will usually be different at different times
τ . For simplicity, we begin by treating τ itself as an
“observable”, and computing the probability density
dp
dτ
∝ lim
t→∞
dN
dτ
(t) . (37)
This is the probability for an observer to find themselves
living a time τ after the big bang of their bubble.
Both the observer distribution, f(τ), and the volume
per bubble, Vy, are the same for all bubbles of our type,
by the above assumptions. Therefore, the total number
of τ -observations made by the time t depends on t only
through the total number of bubbles n(t − τ) produced
prior to the time t− τ :
dN
dτ
(t) = n(t− τ)
dN (1)
dτ
(τ) = f(τ)Vy n(t− τ)
= f(τ)Vy exp [3Hbig(t− τ)] . (38)
Since the t dependence of the answer is just an overall
normalization, it drops out of the probability distribution
and we get the simple answer
dp
dτ
∝ f(τ) exp(−3Hbigτ) . (39)
In our universe, it is reasonable to assume that f(τ) has
a broad (at least Gyr-scale) peak at some τpeak ∼ O(10
Gyr), since at early times, there was no structure, and at
late times, there will be no free energy. In any case, there
will be no features in f(τ) that can possibly compete with
the exponential factor in Eq. (39), which suppresses the
probability of late-time observations at a characteristic
rate set by the microphysical scale Hbig.
For example, with Planckian Hbig ∼ O(1), there are
at any time t
f(13Gyr)
f(13.7Gyr)
exp(1060) ≈ exp(1060) (40)
observers who live 13 Gyr after their local big bang, for
every observer like us. Thus, the probability of seeing a
13.7 Gyr old universe with a 2.7 K background tempera-
ture is vanishingly small compared to the observation of
a warmer CMB and a somewhat younger universe.
This obviously contradicts experiment. Note that the
probability for what we do see is so small that our obser-
vations so far are, by any standards applied in science,
perfectly sufficient to rule out the theory—or in this case,
the measure.
B. Explicit conflict with observation
A possible objection to the above analysis is the fact
that τ , the time since the big bang in our bubble, is not a
physical observable. Therefore, following Tegmark [37],
let us verify explicitly that the youngness paradox man-
ifests itself in the probability distribution for physical
observables.
Some observational consequences of the youngness
pressure in this measure were described more than ten
years ago by Linde, Linde, and Mezhlumian [33]. There,
the authors note that the proper time measure predicts
that we are living at the center of an underdense region
they refer to as an “infloid”. The effect they discuss arises
because regions which spend less time in slow roll infla-
tion (hence regions which reheat sooner and therefore are
underdense) are rewarded. We focus here on a different
9effect which is more clearly in conflict with observation:
the fact that typical observers see a different temperature
than we do.
The probability distribution for the temperature is
dp
dT
=
∫
dτ
dp
dτ
g(T |τ) , (41)
where g(T |τ) is the probability distribution for tempera-
tures at a fixed FRW time. For temperatures not too far
from the average value,
g(T |τ) ∝
1
Tav(τ)
exp
[
−1010
(
T − Tav(τ)
Tav(τ)
)2]
, (42)
where Tav(τ) is the average temperature at time τ , and
the factor of 1010 arises due to the magnitude of the den-
sity perturbations. The probability distribution becomes
dp
dT
∝
∫
dτ
f(τ)
Tav(τ)
exp
[
−3Hbigτ − 10
10
(
T − Tav(τ)
Tav(τ)
)2]
.
(43)
For the moment, let us ignore observations occurring
before 10 Gyr, because for early enough times these for-
mulas will break down. For the times under considera-
tion, the average temperature satisfies
Tav(τ1)
Tav(τ2)
=
(
τ2
τ1
)2/3
. (44)
The probability distribution for temperature becomes
dp
dT
∝
∫
10 Gyr
dτ τ2/3f(τ) exp

−3Hbigτ − 1010
((
T
3.3K
)(
τ
10 Gyr
)2/3
− 1
)2 . (45)
The dominant factor in the integrand is exp(−3Hbigτ),
since this factor varies over the microphysical time scale
Hbig, while the other factors vary on much larger time
scales. Thus the integral is dominated by the lower limit.
So the probability distribution for the temperature, once
fluctuations are taken into account, is just equal to the
distribution at the early time cutoff. Dropping a T -
independent normalization factor, we find
dp
dT
∝ g(T |τ = 10 Gyr) ∝ exp
[
−1010
(
T − 3.3K
3.3K
)2]
.
(46)
It is easy to see that this prediction is ruled out at great
confidence by our observation that T = 2.7 K. The con-
flict only becomes worse as the early time cutoff is re-
duced.
C. Exact treatment of the bubble geometry
In this subsection, we will improve on the above analy-
sis by taking into account the actual dynamics and shape
of bubble walls. Our treatment will clarify the extent to
which the square-bubble approximation is justified, and
confirm that the youngness paradox arises in the proper-
time measure.
Inside a single bubble, as before we define a function
f(τ) giving the number of observations per unit comoving
volume per proper time,
dN (1) = f(τ) dτ dVc = f(τ) 4π sinh
2 ξ dξ dτ . (47)
To get the total number of observations, dN , at given
(τ, ξ), we must sum over all bubbles. We can organize
this sum in terms of the time tnuc < t when each bubble
was nucleated. Note that given the coordinates (τ, ξ)
inside the bubble, there is an upper limit tmaxnuc (τ, ξ) on
the nucleation time so that the region of interest can be
produced before the time t. This relationship was derived
in Sec. (III C). The sum becomes
dN
dτdξ
=
∫ tmaxnuc
0
dtnuc
dn
dt
∣∣∣∣
tnuc
dN (1)
dτdξ
, (48)
where the bubble production rate dn/dt is still given by
Eq. (35). Plugging in, we get
dN
dτdξ
=
∫ tmaxnuc
0
dtnucC exp (3Hbigtnuc) f(τ) 4π sinh
2 ξ
(49)
where, as derived in (33),
tmaxnuc = t− τ −H
−1
big
(
ξ + e−ξ − 1 + ...
)
. (50)
Performing the integral and dropping constant factors,
we get
dN
dτdξ
=
[
e3Hbigt
max
nuc − 1
]
f(τ) sinh2 ξ (51)
=
[
e3Hbig[t−τ−H
−1
big
(ξ+e−ξ−1+...)] − 1
]
f(τ) sinh2 ξ
Taking the limit t→∞, we can ignore the “−1” coming
from the lower limit of integration; in this limit the t
dependence is only an overall multiplicative factor which
vanishes upon normalization. Thus we obtain a simple
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formula for the probability distribution
dN
dξdτ
= f(τ)e−3Hbigτ sinh2 ξe−3(ξ+e
−ξ
−1+...) (52)
The striking feature of this probability distribution is
that it factorizes into a function of the spatial coordi-
nate ξ times a function of the FRW time τ . This is
exactly true, because the “. . .” appearing in the formula
is a function of ξ only.
The distribution as a function of τ is given by
dp
dτ
∝ f(τ)e−3Hbigτ . (53)
This distribution is exactly the same as Eq. (39), which
was derived in the square bubble approximation. So the
youngness paradox appears in exactly the same way in
the true geometry.
The spatial distribution of observers at a fixed FRW
time τ is
dp
dξ
∝ sinh2 ξ exp
[
−3(ξ + e−ξ − 1 + ...)
]
(54)
This distribution peaks at ξ of order one, and falls ex-
ponentially for large ξ. So most observers live within a
few curvature radii of the “center of the universe.” The
center is defined by the geodesic piercing the bubble nu-
cleation point.
D. Why did the square bubble approximation
work?
The main effect of the correctly computed probability
distribution over ξ is to allow only an effective comoving
volume
Vξ,eff = 4π
∫
∞
0
dξ sinh2 ξ exp
[
−3(ξ − 1 + e−ξ)
]
≈ 15.75
(55)
to contribute for every bubble.
The above result could not have been computed in the
square bubble approximation, but it explains why that
approximation worked for computing the temporal distri-
bution of observers. The point is that in a large regime,
it is possible to identify the finite spatial region contain-
ing typical observers with the finite flat patch of “new
vacuum” inserted by hand in the square bubble approx-
imation.
This identification is not a true match, because of the
different spatial curvature. But during and after infla-
tion, there is a long period where curvature is negligible
and the scale factor would be the same function of time
in a flat FRW universe. If the observations contributing
to the measure occur in this regime, then the use of spa-
tially flat time-slices in the square-bubble approximation
will be legitimate.
The effective physical volume at large FRW time τ
is 15.75 a3(τ). During inflation, a(τ) = H−1inf sinhHinfτ .
To match this to the square bubble physical volume,
VyH
−3
inf exp (3Hinfτ), at τ ≫ H
−1
inf , requires the choice
Vy = Vξ,eff/8 ≈ 2 . (56)
Note that in a problem involving different types of bub-
bles, the physical volume of a new bubble will be of or-
der H−3inf . Generically Hinf will be smaller than the out-
side Hubble constant. If we took Eq. (56) literally, the
square bubble approximation would involve replacing a
large number of outside Hubble volumes with the new
vacuum. This contradicts the geometric fact that asymp-
totically, the new bubble takes up the comoving volume
occupied by only one outside Hubble volume at the time
of nucleation. Of course, the choice of Vy dropped out of
ratios, so it could be reduced without affecting relative
probabilities.
In any case, while the square bubble approximation
turned out to be a useful shortcut under the above as-
sumptions, it is just as simple, and much more reliable,
to use the exact geometry, as encoded in Eq. (32), to
compute probabilities.
V. MODIFICATIONS OF THE PROPER TIME
MEASURE
Obviously, the result that practically all observers live
at a much earlier time, and see a very different universe,
than we do, is fatal for the proper time measure. Perhaps
the measure can be modified in some way, so as to avoid
this problem?
A. Don’t ask, don’t tell
Linde advocates a simple resolution to the youngness
paradox in Ref. [16] (see also references therein). One
should simply not ask how long after reheating the typi-
cal observers form, but merely compute the rate at which
reheating hypersurfaces of different inflating vacua are
produced. This restriction has a number of problems.
If we cannot ask about the temperature measured by a
typical observer, the measure is not complete. Moreover,
if we cannot ask about observers, then we cannot count
them, and so we cannot condition on their number. This
would eliminate the anthropic solution to the cosmolog-
ical constant problem. And finally, as noted in Ref. [38],
this restriction does not fully solve the youngness prob-
lem in any case. It merely confines the problem to effects
before reheating. In particular, it gives overwhelming
weight to vacua with a shorter period of inflation, and
thus predicts a wide open universe. Thus, a different
modification is needed.
A general idea for such a fix was outlined in Ref. [38]:
“One should compare apples to apples, instead of com-
paring apples to the trunks of the trees.” In other words,
we should assign a correction factor e3Hbig∆ti to the prob-
ability pi for the observation Oi, where ∆ti is the amount
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of time it takes to produce such an observation, in some
relative sense to be defined below. The corrected relative
probabilities are thus:
P (O1)
P (O2)
=
p(O1)
p(O2)
exp[3Hbig(∆t1 −∆t2)] (57)
= lim
t→∞
N1(t)
N2(t)
exp[3Hbig(∆t1 −∆t2)] .
Compared to Eq. (1), this bolsters mature folk like our-
selves, by compensating for the enormous volume growth
that Boltzmann babies can take advantage of.
No general, sharp definition of ∆ti was attempted in
Ref. [38], where explicit calculations were carried out only
for a model containing two vacua with different lengths
of inflation; ∆ti was defined to be the duration of infla-
tion in each vacuum. While Ref. [38] claimed that the
procedure also resolves other aspects of the youngness
paradox, such as the overwhelming probability for a hot-
ter universe, it offered no definition of ∆t in that context,
nor did it display an explicit computation of the corrected
probability.
In fact, we have been unable to come up with a general
definition of ∆t that succeeds in fixing the youngness
problem. This does not mean that it cannot be done. But
perhaps it will help sharpen the challenge if we discuss a
few proposals that may come to mind.7
B. Spatial averaging
The prediction that we should observe a warmer CMB
temperature arose from the fact that it takes longer to
produce observers who see low CMB temperatures. To
get a more reasonable probability distribution for the
CMB temperature, we want to eliminate the enormous
cost of waiting for the universe to cool off. It seems rea-
sonable to assign ∆t(T ) as the amount of FRW time until
the average background temperature is T . Since we will
only be comparing observations within the same bubble
and after reheating, an additive constant in ∆t is unim-
portant and so we can start our clock at any time we
like.
We explore this proposal mostly because it seems like
the most straightforward and naive fix. In fact, it is
unclear how the above definition would generalize to ob-
servables that can take on the same value at very differ-
ent times. Even for the temperature, small perturbations
render the relation between its average value and a par-
ticular time slice ambiguous at the 10−5 level—much too
large to define ∆t with the required Planckian precision.
We will disregard all these issues, since the modification
fails even in the idealized special case we consider.
7 We thank Andrei Linde for discussions that influenced some of
the definitions explored below. However, we make no claim that
any of them reflect his views accurately.
For temperatures and times close to those we observe,
the average temperature on τ = const slices satisfies
T (τ1)
T (τ2)
=
(
τ2
τ1
)2/3
. (58)
Thus, ∆t(T ) is given by
∆t(T ) = (13.7 Gyr)
(
2.7 K
T
)3/2
. (59)
The modification fails because it is comparatively easy
to find deviations from the average temperature. To see
this, let us begin by considering a further idealization:
Let us exclude fluctuations of T . In other words, we will
assume that the CMB temperature, at fixed τ , is given
everywhere precisely by the same value.
With this additional idealization, the modification ac-
tually works! There is now a one-to-one correspondence
between τ and T , so we can use Eq. (39) to obtain the
(unmodified) probability distribution for T :
dp
dT
=
dp
dτ
dτ
dT
∝ f(τ(T ))
dτ
dT
exp [−3Hbigτ(T )] (60)
where f(τ), as before, is the rate of observations per co-
moving volume per unit time per bubble. The quan-
tity f(τ(T )) dτdT is naturally identified as f(T ), the rate of
observations per comoving volume per unit background
temperature per bubble. Using the previous formula re-
lating time to temperature, we find
dp
dT
∝ f(T ) exp
[
−3Hbig · (13.7 Gyr)
(
2.7 K
T
)3/2]
.
(61)
Still working in the idealization of exactly homoge-
neous background temperature, let us now compute the
modified probability distribution for temperature. It is
dP
dT
∝ f(T ) exp [−3Hbig(τ(T )−∆t(T ))] (62)
We have defined ∆t so that the exponent is zero, so the
modified probability distribution for temperature is sim-
ply proportional to the number of observations at each
temperature,
dP
dT
∝ f(T ) . (63)
This answer seems intuitive and has no youngness prob-
lem. (See, however, the discussion at the end of Sec. VE.)
Once we allow for fluctuations of the temperature,
∆t(T ) can still be defined in terms of the average tem-
perature. But our recipe for repairing the probabilities
no longer works.
Now the starting point is the (unmodified) probability
distribution obtained in Sec. IVB, Eq. (46). After ap-
plying Eq. (58), with ∆t(T ) given by Eq. (59), we obtain
the modified distribution
dP
dT
= exp [3Hbig∆t(T )] g(T |τ = 10 Gyr) (64)
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∆t(T ) = (10 Gyr)
(
3.3K
T
)3/2
, (65)
and assuming Planckian Hbig, we get
dP
dT
= exp
[
1061
(
3.3K
T
)3/2
− 1010
(
T − 3.3K
3.3K
)2]
(66)
The temperature is now driven to the lowest possible
value. It is still favorable to live early, and because of
the primordial density fluctuations, it is not all that hard
to find an anomalously cool region even at early times.
Our modification factor rewards us for this as if we had
honestly waited until the average temperature becomes
so low. Thus, it overcompensates.
This new distribution is also ruled out, at enormous
confidence level, by our observation of 2.7 K.
C. Waiting for the first time
Another possibility is to define ∆ti for the observation
of type Oi as the time it takes the universe, starting from
the beginning of time (the slice Σ0), to produce the first
such observation.
Thus defined, ∆ti—and hence, the corrected
probabilities—will depend on the initial conditions
on Σ0. This dependence may be mild, and in any case
we can see no reason why probabilities (at least for some
observables) should not depend on the initial conditions
of the universe. However, if we define ∆ti as the time
when Ni jumps from 0 to 1, then it will also depend on
accidents of the semiclassical evolution at early times,
such as the time when a particular tunneling event
happens to take place, and we would not be able to
compute it directly from the theory.
This problem can be resolved by defining ∆ti to be
the time when the expectation value 〈Ni(∆t)〉 becomes
1.8 This still depends on initial conditions but can be
computed from the theory in the semiclassical regime.
However, this definition conflicts with an important
property of probabilities. Consider the special case that
O1 and O2 are mutually exclusive outcomes of an experi-
ment. For example, outcome O1 (O2) may be up (down)
when the spin of a single electron is measured by a man
in a penguin suit. In general there may be additional
possible outcomes O3, . . ., but in any case, it must be
true that
p1 + p2 = p12 , (67)
8 More generally, one could consider defining ∆t to be the time
when the expectation value reaches some fixed value Nmin. In
Eq. (71) below, the small volume limit is equivalent to taking
Nmin → ∞ at fixed V .
where p12 is the probability for the outcome “1 or 2”. In-
deed, this property will be satisfied by the original prob-
abilities defined in Eq. (1).
However, ∆t12 < ∆ti, i = 1, 2, because the expected
time when “1 or 2” is first observed is simply the time
when the experiment is first likely to be performed. This
is sooner than the expected time when, say, 1 is first
observed, since the very first experiment can only have
one outcome. Therefore, the corrected probabilities do
not add up correctly:
P1 + P2 = p1e
3Hbig∆t1 + p2e
3Hbig∆t2 (68)
> (p1 + p2)e
3Hbig∆t12 = P12 ,
Another way of saying this is that we can change the total
probability for a set of alternative outcomes by whether
we view the alternatives separately and add probabili-
ties, or group the alternatives together and directly com-
pute the probability for this compound outcome. This is
clearly absurd.
A particularly simple and striking result obtains if we
assume initial conditions that are already in the station-
ary regime. Then
〈Ni(t)〉 = V pi(e
3Hbigt − 1) . (69)
The uncorrected probabilities pi are dynamically deter-
mined by the attractor behavior; the overall scaling V
depends on the volume of Σ0. We find for the correction
factor
e3Hbig∆ti =
V pi + 1
V pi
, (70)
and hence
Pi
Pj
=
V pi + 1
V pj + 1
. (71)
In the large volume limit, there is no correction and the
youngness paradox persists. For finite V , the corrected
probabilities do not obey P1 + P2 = P12. In the limit
V → 0, all alternatives become equally likely, Pi/Pj = 1,
no matter how they were defined!
D. Growing together
A different definition for ∆ti may be motivated by an-
other quote from Ref. [38]: ∆ti is “the time when the
stationary regime becomes established” for the observa-
tion Oi. Mathematically, we may attempt to capture this
idea as follows. At late times, we know that the num-
ber of observations of any type will grow as e3Hbigt, so
N˙i/Ni → 3Hbig. At any finite time, there will be a small
correction to this time dependence, so we may define δti
as the earliest time when∣∣∣∣∣1− N˙i(ti)3HbigNi(ti)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫ . (72)
13
It would seem arbitrary to specify an particular small
deviation ǫ beyond which we consider the stationary
regime established. Therefore, let us take the limit ǫ→ 0.
In this limit each δti contains the same additive diver-
gence, − log ǫ, which we discard and define
∆ti = lim
ǫ→0
δti + log ǫ . (73)
To see that this measure does not work, let us focus
again on the CMB temperature in our own vacuum. For
the sake of argument, suppose that no observers exist
prior to some cutoff FRW time, say, τmin = 10 Gyr. By
the results of Sec. IVB, for any finite geodesic time t,
practically all observations of any value of T are made
within a time of order H−1big after τmin. Therefore, to ac-
curacy H−1big , |1 − N˙T /(3HbigNT )| will drop below ǫ at
the same time t, for any temperature T . Hence, ∆tT is
independent of T to this accuracy.9 Therefore, our “mod-
ification” does not in fact change relative probabilities at
all.
To complete this argument, we should now take the
cutoff FRW time, τmin, earlier and earlier, until it is re-
moved altogether. However, this introduces only infor-
mation about early universe physics into our modification
of the proper time measure. It cannot possibly restore a
reasonable probability distribution for the CMB temper-
ature measured by observers in the present era.
It is interesting that like “spatial averaging”, the
present modification would have worked for (fictitious)
observables that are in one-to-one correspondence with
the FRW time. In this case, it would not have been true
that at any time τ , there is a nonzero amplitude for any
temperature T . Instead,
NT1(t) =
f(T1)
f(T2)
NT2(t+ τ(T2)− τ(T1)) , (74)
and hence,
N˙T1
NT1
(t) =
N˙T2
NT2
(t+ τ(T2)− τ(T1)) . (75)
Then we would have found
∆t1 −∆t2 = ∆t(T1)−∆t(T2) , (76)
and we would have recovered the intuitive result of
Eq. (63).
Apparently, the problem with both of these modifica-
tions is that the value of an observable does not give
us enough information about the FRW time when the
9 A finite width dT is implicit; see Eq. (2) and the footnote there-
after. We use NT as a short notation for
dN
dT
dT . Our conclusion
becomes strictly true only in the ǫ → 0 limit, when the total
volume of the FRW cutoff surfaces between Σ0 and Σt becomes
large enough to contain all possible values of T .
observation is made—but this is precisely the time we
would like to use for ∆t. This motivates our final at-
tempt at modifying the proper time measure, in which
∆t is defined not as a function of observables, but di-
rectly as a function of the time when the observation is
made, regardless of its outcome.
E. Anticipation
Instead of tying ∆t to a specific observable, we can go
back and fix the time shift directly for the geodesics. Ef-
fectively, it is like “anticipating” all observations that will
happen in a given bubble. More precisely, let us project
every observation Oi inside a bubble back to the most
recent bubble wall along the geodesics of the congruence,
and count it toward Ni(t) as soon as the relevant portion
of the wall lies below Σt. This amounts to choosing ∆ti
to be the geodesic time between the domain wall and the
observation. It is not difficult to see that this choice elim-
inates any pressure to make observations very early, and
that it reduces to the ∆t’s used in the specific example of
Ref. [38]. However, in general it suffers from two major
problems.
First, it is not sharply enough defined. The prescrip-
tion involves projecting onto domain walls. These objects
have an inherent thickness, which can be microscopic, but
need not be Planckian. This is a problem because we
need a proposal which is well-defined at the length scale
H−1big , which may be Planckian. Moreover, an approxi-
mately defined object like a domain wall has no place in
a fundamental definition of probabilities for all observa-
tions. There is a smooth interpolation between objects
that appear obviously recognizable as domain walls, and
general field configurations. (This objection could be
raised also against other measures that involve domain
walls in their definition, such as Ref. [18].)
On the observational side, the projection method suf-
fers from the “Boltzmann brain” problem [19, 20]. The
reason is that we are now completely indifferent to when
observations inside the bubble are made. By the results
of Sec. IVD, we may focus on a single comoving volume
at the center of any metastable de Sitter bubble with
sufficiently small cosmological constant (such as, presum-
ably, our own vacuum). An infinite number of observers
are formed at late times in this volume, due to rare ther-
mal fluctuations [19]. All of these Boltzmann brains will
be projected back, and so will dominate over other ob-
servers. Thus, with probability 1, we should be Boltz-
mann brains, which is in conflict with observation [44].
(Alternatively, we can interpret this infinity as telling
us that projection defeats the most basic purpose of the
measure, which is to regulate the infinities occurring in
eternal inflation.)
Mathematically, the Boltzmann brain problem shows
up as follows. The effect of the “anticipation” modifica-
tion is to render the temperature distribution apparently
well-behaved: we have finally succeeded in producing the
14
hoped-for Eq. (63). But this equation is a poisoned chal-
ice: it is not as harmless at it looks. Boltzmann brains
arise at a fixed rate per unit time and unit physical vol-
ume, not per comoving volume. Thus, the comoving ob-
server density f(τ) grows exponentially with the scale
factor at extremely late times, so f(T ) diverges at the
Hawking temperature of the de Sitter space.
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